Sugar sector in Croatia: competitive or not? by Franic, Ramona & Kumric, Ornella
Sugar sector in Croatia: competitive  or not?
Ramona Franic 1, Ornella Kumric 2
1 Faculty of Agriculture,  University of Zagreb, Department  of Agricultural  
Economics  and  Rural Sociology Svetosimunska  cesta  25 10 000 Zagreb, 
Croatia (Phone: +385  1 239 3757, Fax: +385  1 2393  745), ramonaf@agr.hr  
2 Faculty of Agriculture,  University of Zagreb, Department  of Agricultural  
Economics  and  Rural Sociology Svetosimunska  cesta  25 10 000 Zagreb, 
Croatia (Phone: +385  1 239 3364, Fax: +385  1 2393  745), okumric@agr.hr  
Paper prepared  for presentation  at the  98 th EAAE Seminar ‘Marketing  
Dynamics  within  the Global Trading  System: New  Perspectives’, 
Chania, Crete, Greece  as in: 29 June – 2 July, 2006
Copyright  2006  by [Ramona  Franic, Ornella Kumric].  All rights reserved.  
Readers may  make  verbatim  copies of this document  for non- commercial  
1purposes by any  means, provided  that this copyright  notice appears on all 
such copies.
2Sugar sector in Croatia: competitive  or not?
Ramona  Franic 1, Ornella Kumric 2
1 Faculty of Agriculture,  University of Zagreb, Department  of Agricultural  Economics  and  Rural 
Sociology Svetosimunska  cesta  25 10 000 Zagreb, Croatia  (Phone: +385  1 239 3757, Fax: +385  1 
2393  745), ramonaf@agr.hr  
2 Faculty of Agriculture, University of Zagreb, Department  of Agricultural  Economics  and  Rural 
Sociology Svetosimunska  cesta  25 10 000 Zagreb, Croatia  (Phone: +385  1 239 3364, Fax: +385  1 
2393  745), okumric@agr.hr   
Abstract . The sugar sector is small in agricultural sector, occupying  1.5% of the cultivable land area  
and  accounting  for approximately  1.2% of agricultural  GDP (excluding  processing  which  probably  
accounts  for  a  further  1%).   It does,  however,  account  for  6.5% of  all budgetary  payments  to  
agriculture,  showing  its disproportionate  dependence  on  taxpayers'  money.  Sugar  production  in 
Croatia is characterized  by high  production  costs, struggling  with  a strong  competition  at the world  
market.  Despite the results of the competitiveness  study,  in which  the  DRC calculation  showed  that  
sugar  production  is not internationally  competitive,  one  of the  basic characteristics of our  foreign  
trade  in sugar till 2003  was high  exports. Sharp  shift in the EU sugar policy will result in sugar price  
decrease due to the WTO rules, which  will affect the Croatian  sugar industry. Therefore, Croatia will 
have  to apply  measures  for decreasing  production  costs and  increasing  production,  with  the  final  
goal of price decrease for about 20%. For these reasons, it will be necessary  to strive for the quota  at  
the level of  average  production  of three Croatian  sugar- plants.
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1. Introduction
The word  "competitiveness"  is very popular  in transition  countries  in the  
period  of EU accession:  are  we competitive?… which  productions  can  be 
competitive?… with  regard  to  whom?… how  much?  These  questions  are 
particularly  interesting  in  agricultural  sector  analyses,  considering  that  
this sector  still plays an important  role in transition  countries'  economies,  
and  so in Croatia. The pre- accession  period  intensifies  debates  about  the  
question  how  to find  the  place  for  our  agricultural  and  food  products  in 
already  saturated  EU markets.
However,  despite  the  popularity  of  these  debates,  in  Croatia  there  was 
only   one   quantitative   analysis   of   agricultural   sector   competitiveness  
made   in   2000.   Unfortunately,   but   expected,   it   was   determined   that  
Croatian   agriculture   is   in   majority   of   sectors   internationally 
uncompetitive, and  in sugar  production  as well. Moreover, this  sector  was 
estimated  as  highly  uncompetitive,  so  the  fact  that  sugar  is now  one  of 
the  most  successful  export  product  is even  more  surprising.  That  is, of 
course,  the  result  of  trade  liberalization  (in  2000  European  Union  has  
abolished  import  tariffs  on  Croatian  sugar)  which  enabled  great  export  
expansion   and   positive   business   results   for   our   sugar   processing  
factories.   Due   to   our   producers'   opinion,   under   the   new   trade  
3circumstances,  Croatian  sugar  is competitive  on  EU market  by its  price 
and  quality.
That   is   why   this   paper   discusses   about   of   (un)competitiveness   of 
domestic  sugar  production,  and  about  different  reasons  that  prove or not  
those   estimates.   Starting   from   knowledge   on   the   most   important  
elements  that  influence  competitiveness  in sugar  production  (production  
costs,   foreign   exchange   rates,   technical   performance,   liberalization   of 
sugar   marketing) [1],  we   suppose   that   the   competitiveness   of   Croatian  
sugar  industry  depends  on several reasons  that  go beyond  those  involved  
in the first  competitiveness  study. 
Such  starting  point  doesn't  mean,  however,  that  in competitive  analysis  
we   should   ignore   obvious   facts   that   influence   international  
competitiveness   in   sugar   production,   such   as   differences   in   costs   of 
production  between  producers  of beet  sugar  and  cane  sugar,  efficient  or 
distorting  domestic  sugar  policies  in developed  countries,  misallocation  
of   resources   in   countries   that   have   preferential   access   to   developed  
country  sugar  market  etc. [2] 
1.1.Methodological  remarks
The   work   paper   is   secondary   analysis.   Data   that   have   already   been  
calculated  before,  are  used  as  basis  for  this  elaboration  of sugar  sector  
competitiveness  in Croatia. 
The   basic   (and   only   so   far)   exact   method   used   to   evaluate   Croatian  
agricultural   competitiveness   was   the   DRC   (Domestic   Resource   Cost), 
which  measures  international  competitiveness  by comparing  the  cost  of 
domestic  resources  used  in producing  a good  with the  value added  of the 
good.  Clearly,  the  value  added  should  be  greater  than  the  cost  of  the  
resources   used.   The   measure   of  international  competitiveness   comes  
from  using  world  or  economic  prices  to  value  farm  output  and  inputs,  
rather  than  domestic  prices  which  may  reflect  high  levels  of protection, 
domestic   regulations   which   distort   markets,   monopoly   pricing   in   the  
product  or  input  markets,  or  other  failures  in the  market  which  prevent  
an internationally competitive market  price emerging.
In several commodity  studies,  within  the  Competitiveness  study  prepared  
for  Croatian  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry  in 2000 [4], the  DRC is 
presented  as  a ratio  of  domestic  costs  to  the  real  value  added.  A ratio 
greater  than  1 indicates  the  sector  is  not  competitive  because  the  real 
costs  are  greater  than  the  value  added.    Conversely,  a ratio  less  than  1 
indicates  a competitive  sector.  While the  DRC method  is one  of the  best  
methods   of   measuring   comparative   advantage   (and   therefore   current  
competitiveness),  it does  have  some  limitations  which  should  be  noted.  
There are also limitations  in its application  to Croatia:
4- First,   DRCs   are   data   intensive;   in   Croatia,   there   is   no   farm  
management  survey  which  could  provide  the  farm  level  data  on 
quantity   and   prices   of   inputs.   In   the   absence   of   survey   data,  
information   was   collected   from   representative   farms   by   the 
project's  local experts,  and  this was supplemented  by farm  visits  by 
the  international  expert.  This  data  therefore  tends  to  reflect  the 
better  than  average farmer.
- Second,  in any country  there  are different  production  systems  with  
different  technologies  and  different  scales  of operation,  and  each  
will have  a different  cost  structure.  For the  purpose  of measuring  
competitiveness  in Croatian  agriculture  data  were  used  for  family 
farms   as   distinct   from   the   larger   legal   entities   which   are   the 
successors   of   the   former   Agrokombinats.   As   family   farms   are 
regarded  as  the  basic  business  unit,  they  are  the  main  focus  of 
policy. 
- Third,  the  DRC ratio  is a static  measure,  reflecting  current  world  
prices   and   currently   used   technologies.   A  change   in   either   can 
change  the  conclusion  on  competitiveness.  Sensitivity  analysis  has  
therefore   been   undertaken   to   test   the   impact   of   adopting   new 
technologies  (for  example  using  performance  measures  from  EU 
countries) or of world price changes. 
- Finally, the  performance  of an entire  sector  with  a single number  is 
not  recommendable.  Every farm  has  its  own  unique  DRC ratio,  so 
the ratio was estimated  only for what  was consider  a representative  
group  of family- based  farms  which  are likely to have  a better  than  
average  performance.
The   DRC   ratio   given   in   these   studies   therefore   shows   whether   an 
important  part  (but  still only a part) of the  sector  is or is not  competitive 
under  current  conditions.  The  ratio  does  not,  though,  show  the  cause  or 
source  of  the  sector's  comparative  advantage  or  disadvantage.  Insights  
into   this   are   gained   from   the   data   behind   the   DRC  ratio   and   in   an 
examination  of  trade  and  domestic  policies,  technical  performance  and  
market  structures  (where  market  failures  such  as the  under- provision  of 
public   goods   and   monopolistic/monopsonistic   power   may   exist).   It   is 
these  aspects  which  are  fundamental  to  the  analysis  of competitiveness  
and  on which the report's  recommendations  are based.
In addition  to  the  results  of  the  DRC analysis,  in  the  final  part  of  the  
paper  we briefly  discuss  about  other  elements  whose  interaction  makes  
the   concept   of   so   called   systemic   competitiveness.   Systemic  
competitiveness   is   the   interaction   between   four   elements   of 
competitiveness:  Micro- level  competitiveness  (managerial  competencies, 
entrepreneurial   strategy,   interaction   between   suppliers,   producers,  
customers),   Meso- level   competitiveness   (education   policy,   structural  
policy,   regional   policy),   Meta- level   competitiveness   (socio- cultural  
factors,   value   orientations,   basic   configurations   of   political,   legal   and  
economic   organizations,  strategic  and  policy  capabilities),   and  Macro-
5level competitiveness  (budgetary  policy, competitive  policy, trade  policy, 
etc).[5]  
2. Recent developments in the sugar industry in Croatia
2.1. Structure  of the sugar production  sector
According  to the  2003  Agricultural  Register,  2,454  family farms  and  173 
business   entities   have   been   cultivating   sugar   beet.   As   a   rule,   these  
producers   have   farms   that   are   rather   above   Croatian   average.   More 
precisely, about  30% of family farms  cultivate  sugar  beet on the area of 20 
hectares  or  more,  and  further  20% on  area  between  10  and  20  hectares. 
The  size  of the  business  entities  in this  production  is mostly  more  than  
100 hectares.
Three   factories   process   sugar   beet   and   they   employ   about   1,200  
employees  in total. After a long and  complex privatization  process,  two of 
these   factories   are   now   private- owned,   while   the   third   one   is 
predominately  owned  by the  state.  Average  daily  sugar  beet  processing  
capacity in Croatia is 6,300  tones.
62.2. Production  and trade
The  sugar  sector  is  small  in  agricultural  sector,  occupying  1.5% of  the  
cultivable land  area and  accounting  for approximately 1.2% of agricultural  
GDP (excluding  processing  which  probably  accounts  for  a further  1%). It 
does, however, account  for 6.5% of all budgetary  payments  to agriculture, 
showing its disproportionate  dependence  on taxpayers'  money.
With  respect  to  arable  land,  beet  growing  is concentrated  exclusively  in 
the   eastern   part   of   Continental   Croatia.   Among   the   10   beet   growing 
counties  in Panonia  and  the  Eastern  Central  region,  Osijek- Baranja  and  
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Figure 1. Areas  sawn  by sugar  beets
Data  on  production  and  processing  from  the  end  of  1990s  as  well  as 
trade   flows   of   final   products   for   the   country   as   a   whole   reveal   the  
moderate  average  yield  of beets  per  hectare,  around  43 tones  compared  
to Austria’s  55, and  especially the  low yield  of sugar  per  unit  of beet  at 
the  end  of 1990s,  about  11- 12%, compared  to Austria’s 15%. The average 
production  of the beet root  is about  one million tones  annually.
The sugar  production  in Croatia  is characterized  by high production  costs  
caused  by rather  low technical  efficiency of the  sugar  factories  compared  
to  their  EU counterparts,  low  yield  per  hectare  and  low  level  of  sugar  
produced  per  ha. Among  the  principal  reasons,  however,  there  seems  to 
7be  the  small- plot  pattern  of  farming,  which  for  its  proper  functioning  
relies  on  a costly  intermediary  tier  of  agents,  the  contractors,  heirs  in 
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Figure 2. Sugar production  in Croatia
Table 1. Characteristics  of Croatia's sugar factories,  1997- 1999  
average
Description Osijek Zupanja Virovitica Total
Nominal Processing  
Capacity (t beet/24  
hours)
6,000 5,500 4,500 16,000
Beets Processed,  t 439,000 355,663 349,521 1,144,184
Total Number  of Crop 
Days
73 82 80
Av. Daily Slicing Rate, t 6,026 4,354 4,044
Sugar Produced,  t 48,906 41,096 39,837 129,839
Source: Republic of Croatia, Competitiveness  in Agriculture  and  EU 
accession.  The Commodity  Studies. The Sugar Sector  Competitiveness  
Report. MAFWM, 2000
Till the  end  of 1990s,  Croatia  was  not  a large  trader  in sugar,  neither  as 
an  importer  nor  exporter.  But, the  most  significant  impact  on  Croatian  
sugar  market  was caused  by EU decision  on abolition  of tariffs  on imports  
the  products  from  Croatia  (about  17%), which  applies  since  the  end  of 
82000.   By   tariff   elimination   Croatian   sugar   became   competitive   on 
European  market,  and  since than  Croatia  realizes  considerable  increase  in 
exports.
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Figure 3. Croatia: value of foreign  trade  in sugar, USD
Table 2. Export  orientation  of sugar  in Croatia
(t)
Year Sugar production Exports  of sugar   Export  orientation  
rate
1999 113.966 271 0,24
2000 58.950 807 1,37
2001 138.617 40.364 29,12
2002 170.000 70.813 41,65
2003. 96.796 176.637 182,5
2004. 142.857 180.000 126,0
Source: Central Bureau  of Statistics  of the Republic of Croatia
2.3. Changing  sugar policy  in Croatia
Till   the   year   2000,   in   addition   to   the   import   tariff,   the   government  
supported  the  growing  of sugar  beets  by paying  an  area- based  subsidy. 
9High   production   costs,   specifically   those   caused   by   the   purchase   of 
inputs  such  as  fertilizers  and  plant  protection  chemicals,  were  generally 
given   as   a   reason.   These   payments,   however,   were   restricted   to   land  
included  in the existing  quota  system.  
The  government  also  guaranteed  the  price  of  beets.  For  1999,  this  was 
200   HK per  ton  (about  26   EUR), the  reference  sucrose  content  being  
15.5%. For 2000, the  floor  price was reduced  to 190  HK (25 EUR), and  the 
reference   sucrose   raised   to   16.0%.  The   law   provides   for   the   state   to 
acquire  any  beet  that  cannot  be sold  at  or  above  this  price.  In practice, 
however, this  situation  has  never  occurred,  the  factories  being committed  
by  “gentlemen’s  agreement”  not  to  let  the  beet  price  drop  below  the  
stipulated  level.  
In addition,  the  government  absorbs  part  of  the  cost  of  certified  seed. 
Subsidy  payments  for  the  purchase  of NPK fertilizers  have  existed  in the 
past,  but  were  discontinued.  Tractor  fuel,  the  so- called   “blue  diesel”, 
priced  at a reduced  rate  of initially HK 2.60 (0.34 EUR), and  later  HK 3.00 
(0.4  EUR) per  litre,  is  being  made  available  to  beet  growers  since  mid  
2000.
Since 2000, the government  has  no obligation  of intervention  purchase  in 
cases   of   market   fluctuations   (if   market   prices   decrease   below   the 
guaranteed  prices). Also, the year 2000  was the last year when  guaranteed  
prices  were used, when  they were 0.19 kn/kg  (0.025 EUR) with the sucrose  
content  of 15.5%. Since the subsidy  system  were changed  during  the 1999  
reform,  incentives  for the  sugar  beet  growing  are predicted  at the  level of 
3,000   kn   per   ha   (about   400   EUR  per   ha),   and   the   maximum   annual  
support   per   farm   could   be   2   mill.   kn   (about   267,000   EUR),  but   the 
minimal  farm  size  should  be 3 ha. In the  period  1995- 2003  subsidies  for 























Figure 4. Subsidies  for sugar  beet  production
During  the  last  decade,  Government  used  different  intervention  schemes  
in   agriculture,   due   to   actual   international   trade   agreements   (WTO, 
bilateral, and  recently  within  the  Stabilization  and  Accession  Agreements  
with  the  EU – SAA). Combination  of  market  price  protection  measures  
together  with different  policies  of domestic  support  in agriculture,  and  in 
sugar   sector   as   well,   resulted   with   rather   high   protection   indicators.  
Nominal  protection  rates  for  sugar  beets  were  averagely  70%, and  for  
sugar  more  than  135% in the period  1993- 1997, and  the Producer  subsidy  
equivalents  for  the  same  period  were  about  64% for  the  sugar  beets,  and  
about  30% for sugar.  However, the  indicators  of effective protection  were 
considerably   higher   for   processed   products   (sugar),   reflecting  
disadvantage  of domestic  sugar  beet  producers  regarding  their  high costs  
of inputs  in relation  to those  in developed  countries. [6] Some  preliminary  
results  of government  intervention  analysis  under  different  scenarios  of 
international  policy  arrangements  (such  as  SAA, or  Mid- Term  Review) 
showed  that  indicators  of  nominal  protection  for  sugar  beet  would  be 
around  30%, and  effective around  26%.
Regarding  foreign  trade  regime,  applicable  duty  rates  are  determined  by 
the Customs  Tariff Regulation  each year. In the Regulation, MFN duties, as 
well as preferential  import  conditions,  are listed  for each  product.  Import  
of agricultural  products  is not conditioned  by import  licensing.
Table 3. MFN tariffs  for sugar  beet and  sugar
11Product description Basic duty  rate
2005 2006
Sugar beet 12% 10%
Raw  sugar  produced  from  sugar  cane, 
not   containing   added   flavouring   or 
colouring  matter
10%+18.8  €/100  
kg
5%+1.3 €/100  kg (for 
refining)
10.0%+17.7  €/100  kg 
(other)
Raw sugar  produced  from  sugar  beets, 
not   containing   added   flavouring   or 
colouring  matter
10%+21.8  €/100  
kg
5%+1.3 €/100  kg (for 
refining)
10%+20.5  €/100  kg 
(other)
Cane or beet  sugar, refined 28.5 €/100  kg 27 €/100  kg
Source: MAFWM
Preferential   sugar   trade   conditions   have   been   agreed   upon   and   are 
applied   in   trade   with   the   European   Union,   Bosnia   and   Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Serbia and  Montenegro, Moldavia, Bulgaria and  Albania.
3. How competitive is sugar production
3.1. Domestic  resource  cost
The  analysis  of  domestic  cost  of  resources  and,  consequently,  costs  of 
production,   is   based   on   previously   mentioned   Competitiveness   study, 
within  is  completed  the  Policy  Analysis  Matrix  (PAM) for  each  of  two 
systems   of   the   sugar   sector.   The   first   one   captures   a   former   Agro-
Kombinat  involved  in beet  growing  on  a large  scale  farm  (200  ha). The 
second  one  represents  a commercial  family farm  of about  100  ha, 20 ha 
of which  are  sown  to sugar  beets.  The PAMs for  these  two  multi- activity 
systems,  identifying  accounting  and  economic  values  for  revenues  and  
costs,  as  well  as  the  corresponding  DRC ratio  calculations,  appear  in 
Table 4 and  5 respectively. 
Table 4. DRC analysis  – PAM and  the DRC ratio
System Beet Sugar Currency: USD
Activities: Prod.+Proc. of Beets, Ex-Kombinat, 
1999
Activity Unit (AU): t of Sugar






12Output  Revenues 708.15 366.93 341.23
Cost of Tradable  Inputs 302.83 192.69 110.14
Domestic Resource  Costs 627.55 585.29 42.26
Profits - 222.23 - 411.05 188.83
DRC Ratio:  585.29/(366.93- 192.69) = 3.3591
Source: Same as in Table 1
Table 5. DRC analysis  – PAM and  the DRC ratio
System Beet Sugar Currency: USD
Activities: Prod.+Proc. of Beets, Family Farm, 
1999
Activity Unit (AU): t of Sugar








Cost of Tradable  Inputs
209.17 132.25 76.93
Domestic Resource  Costs
513.24 472.82 40.42
Profits - 22.76 - 247.29 224.54
DRC Ratio: 472.82( 357.78- 132.25)     = 2.0965
Source: Same as in Table 1
The  DRC ratios  for  the  two  sugar  systems,  the  ex- kombinat  and  the  
commercial- family- farm  beet  growers  respectively, are  3.4 and  2.1. This 
indicates   that   under   prevailing   conditions   it   is   not   profitable   for  the  
Croatian  economy  to  be  engaged  in the  production  of beet  sugar  under  
either  of the two systems.  Both ratios  are larger  than  one, attesting  to the  
fact  that  the  domestic  resources  spent  in this  pursuit  exceed  the  value  
created.   The   difference   between   the   two   ratios   does   corroborate   the 
relatively   higher   efficiency   of   the   family- farm- based   operation. 
Nevertheless,  its  relative  advantages  do  not  make  it efficient  in absolute  
terms.  
The  reasons  for  this  lack  of competitiveness  lie in a number  of factors:  
beet   yields,   beet   quality   (sucrose   levels),   technology,   labor   use,   and  
management.   Nonetheless,   even   with   reasonable   improvements   in   all 
these  aspects,  Croatian  sugar  production  would  not  be  competitive  on 
world  markets  with sugar  at price levels like in 1999.
How sensitive is the conclusion  on uncompetitiveness  to changes  in some  
of the prices  and  technical performances?  Tables 6 and  7 show changes  in 
13the  DRC ratios  with  changes  in world  prices,  yields,  sucrose  content  of 
beets  and  factory efficiencies.





Production  and Processing  of Sugar beets  of Ex-Kombinat
Parameters
Included
1999 Scenario  Conditions  Different  from  Base
(Base) #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6




1,820 2,500 3,500 3,500
Agricultural  Yield 
of Sugar beets
Mt/ha 33.5 40.0 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 55.0
Sucrose  Content  
of Sugar beets
13.1% 14.5% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 17.5%
Corresp.  Price of 
Sugar beets   
HK/M
t




80.0% 82.0% 84.0% 84.0% 84.0% 86.0%










Source: Same as in Table 1





Production  and Processing  of Sugar beets  from Commercial Family Farm
Parameters
Included
1999 Scenario  Conditions  Different  from  Base
(Base) #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6




1,820 2,500 3,500 3,500




42.5 46.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 55.0
Sucrose  Content  
of Sugar beets
14.1% 15.0% 16.2% 16.2% 16.2% 16.2% 17.5%
Corresp.  Price of 
Sugar beets   
HK/M
t
181.2 193.7 207.2 207.2 207.2 207.2 227.0
Factory 
Efficiency, Sugar 
80.0% 82.0% 84.0% 84.0% 84.0% 86.0%
14on Sucrose












Source: Same as in Table 1
15In each  case, a total  of six scenarios  were  specified,  in which  parameters  
reflecting  conditions  in beet  production  and  beet  processing,  as  well as 
the  world  market  price  of  sugar  were  changed  one  at  a  time.  It  was  
concluded   that   even   if   solid   agricultural   and   technical   results   were 
assumed,  sugar  in  Croatia  would  not  be  competitive.  That  would  only 
occur  if the  world  price  of  sugar  were  to  increase  from  its  level  of HK 
1,820  per  ton  in 1999  (US¢10/lb)  to  somewhere  between  KH 2,500  and  
3,500  per  ton  (US¢15/lb  and  US¢20/lb). At the  time, that  was an increase  
of between  50% and  100%. 
The  major  factor  which  could  make  Croatian  sugar  competitive  is  the 
world  market  price  of sugar,  which  is completely  exogenous.  The  world  
market   price   that   would   make   beet   sugar   production   in   Croatia  
competitive   is   somewhere   between   US¢15/lb   and   US¢20/lb,   and  
occasionally the world market  does  reach  these  levels.
3.2. Trading  terms
In year 2000  European  Union  has  eliminated  tariffs  on sugar  import  from  
the   Republic   of   Croatia,   which   enabled   great   export   expansion   and  
positive business  results  for all three  sugar  factories  in Croatia. According  
to SAA regulations,  Croatia  had  the  possibility  to export  unlimited  sugar  
quantities  on  EU markets  free  of  tariffs.  However,  in  2004,  European  
Commission  proposed  general reform  of the subsidy  system  for the sugar  
production,  under  which  producers  would  receive  40% less  subsidies  for 
production   of   sugar   beets,   together   with   gradually   decreasing   of 
production  quota.
That is why from  Croatia has  been  asked  to negotiate  about  quota  system,  
within  the  proposition  regarding  modification  of  the  import  regime  for 
Western  Balkans,  in order  to provide  EU partners  with  a clear  framework  
which,  while allowing  the  respect  of present  trade  concessions,  prepares  
their  sector  for the  adjustments  needed  to perform  within  a realistic and  
economically sustainable  environment.  [7]    
Major shift  in the  sugar  policy will reflects  primarily on the  sugar  market  
price fall toward  the  WTO regulation,  from  the  current  632  to 421  EUR/t, 
that  is, an effective  price  reduction  of 36%. That  will reflects  on Croatian  
sugar  policy  for  sure,  but,  it  is  expected  that,  despite  the  announced  
decrease  in subsidies  and  prices,  EU sugar  prices  will stay  considerably  
above the world  prices  which will make  EU market  attractive for countries  
that  achieved  preferential  treatment,  as Croatia.
For   Croatia   it   means   that   –  if   our   intention   is   to   keep   the   current  
competitive  price  of  sugar  for  exports  in  the  EU market  – we  need  to 
decrease  our  production  costs  and  increase  production  in the  next  few 
year,  while  the  price  should  fall for  about  1 kn  per  kg (0.135  EUR), or 
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average  price  of  about  650  EUR/t,  while  the  average  price  in the  EU is 
about  750  EUR, and  that  is the  reason  why almost  all domestic  produced  
quantities  are  exported  on  the  EU markets,  mostly  Italian.  This  was  the 
reason  for Croatian  government  to take  an additional  effort  to ensure  the  
quota  at  the  level  of  average  production  of  all  three  Croatian  sugar-
plants.
3.3. Other reasons   
Improvements   on   sugar   markets,   as   a   result   of   foreign   trade  
liberalization,   but   also   some   improvements   on   domestic   markets   are 
noted  as  reasons  for  the  recent  optimism  of domestic  sugar  producers.  
These  reasons  relate  to some  elements  of economic  environment,  such  as 
more   favorable   conditions   on   domestic   financial   markets,   improved  
quality   of   domestic   raw   materials,   improved   quality   of   sugar   and  
increased   interest   for   the   high- quality   sugar   on   the   foreign   markets.  
Moreover,  some  of  these  reasons  are  found  in  the  sphere  of  business  
behavior   (business   culture,   as   the   element   of   socio- cultural   capital): 
preventing  illegal import,  capability  of domestic  public  administration  to 
react  on  changes  and  distortions  on  international  markets,  ability of top  
managers   to   understand   international   circumstances   and   to   create  
business  decisions  toward  these  circumstances  (such  as  in privatization  
processes,  technological adjustments,  structural  adjustments  etc).[8]  
One  such  "training"  of  adjustment  in  sugar  sector  was  noted  in  2002, 
when  Croatian  Customs  administration  had  to  prove  their  capability  to 
correct  mistakes  and  disrespect  of preferences  in international  trade.  On 
the   other   hand,   positive   business   results   of   the   sugar   industry   are 
reflected   not   only   in   their   economic   efficiency,   but   also   in   local 
communities  and  family farms,  thanks  to satisfactory  and  stable  incomes  
that  ensured  adequately  life standard  for  their  members.  However,  such  
partial  estimates  have  to  be  tested  by  additional  research  that  would  
explain   benefits   and   costs   for   this   particular   sector   during   the   EU 
accession,  as we can see to be done  in some  other  transition  countries. [9]
4. Conclusion comments
Due  to  the  Competitiveness  report,  the  sugar  beet  production  and  beet 
processing  was  not  competitive  in Croatia  at the  end  of 1990s.   It would  
require  major  improvements  in management,  technology and  sugar  prices  
for this to be achieved. 
It   is   well   known   that   the   international   sugar   market   itself   is   highly 
distorted  because  of the  subsidized  production  of the  EU and  the  USA. It 
17is also  true  that  sugar  from  cane  can  be produced  far more  cheaply  than  
from  beet  grown  in Europe. Sugar production  in the  EU is not  competitive 
because  but  it was started  because  of historic  food  security  and  strategic 
reasons  -  reasons  which have little relevance  to a modern  economy  -  and  
is now  maintained  because  the  large  industry  which  emerged  from  the  
protection   has   substantial   lobbying   power.   The   subsidy   from   sugar  
consumers  to  EU beet  growers  and  processors  is considerable,  and  has  
perhaps  been  considered  politically acceptable  in recent  times  because  EU 
consumers  have  relatively  high  incomes  and  sugar  is not  an  important  
part  of their  total consumption.  However, recent  developments  under  the  
WTO caused  that  the high level of protection  would  be whittled  away over 
time. 
The question  for Croatia  which  is neither  large  nor  rich  is whether,  given 
its  domestic  constraints  and  the  value  of  the  product,  how  to  provide  
long term  support  for the sugar  sector  to keep  the prices  low and  to keep  
the  income  of the  sugar  beet  growers.  This  would  ask  a complex  social 
cost- benefit  analysis  taking  a long term  view of world  markets,  Croatia's  
position  in the EU, and  EU sugar  policy.
In   the   meantime,   the   Croatian   authorities   can   improve   the 
competitiveness  of the  sector  (without  making  it competitive  in absolute  
terms)  by  improving  the  market  environment.  Specifically,  this  means  
improvements   in   the   land   market,   improvements   in   technological 
performance  (through  investments  into  the  infrastructure  for  drainage  
and   irrigation,   further   investments   in   the   processing   capacities  
modernization).  
Moreover,  it has  to  be  intensified  the  use  of professional  and  scientific 
research  into  administrative,  but  also  business  decision- making  process. 
Concretely,   it   is   suggested   to   examine   the   economics   of   production  
location  and  the quota  allocation  method  (because  some  production  areas  
are  considerable  distances  from  the  nearest  processing  facilities).  It is 
also  expected  that  trade  liberalization  should  result  with  reducing  the 
input   prices   for   agricultural   producers,   which   would   considerably 
decrease  production  costs.
According  to  positive  trade  balance  in a last  4 years  and  increasing  in 
agricultural  yield  per  ha  (45,66t/ha  in  2005.)  it  can  be  said  that  sugar  
sector  is competitive  at the  EU market  and  has  comparative  advantage  at 
the   World   market,   but   that   should   yet   be   verified   by   further   proper  
calculations.  
General   economic   environment   has   to   be   arranged   to   encourage   the 
operation   of   the   commercial   credit   market,   to   improve   contract  
enforceability  and  business  discipline,  which  will hopefully  contribute  to 
the  encouragement  of  foreign  investments.  These  structural  measures,  
together  with  other  social  and  rural  development  policies  should  ensure  
18long- term   rural   efficiency   and   competitiveness   in   agriculture,   and   in 
sugar   sector   within,   more   resistant   on   factors   on   which   they   are 
powerless  to control, as world prices, exchange  rate or quota  regimes.
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